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Dependent societies 
and crisis in 
Latin America: the 
challenges of social 
and political 
transformation 
Germán W. Rama 
Enzo Faletto* 
T h e au thors propose an analysis of dependent 
economies and societies in Latin America. They begin 
by discussing current forms of dependency, both in 
terms of the internationalization of the domestic mar-
ket and in terms of structure of dependent capitalism. 
They present certain hypotheses concerning the 
economic crisis, relating it to the problems of growth 
and development when these depend on technological 
renovation and on financing from the centres. 
They then discuss the structural changes that have 
taken place in the region as a result of its dependent 
development, relations between included and margin-
al sectors, and transformations in the groups belong-
ing to the "modern" social structure, especially the 
subordinate ones, since their orientations are es-
pecially important when it comes to deciding on op-
tions for dealing with the crisis. 
In the third place, they examine the question of the 
political crisis in the light of the social crystallization 
of dependencies of previous periods. Populist and 
reformist efforts and revolutions from above have 
shown up the contradictions that must be dealt with by 
dependent capitalism in trying to stabilize the social 
system and create conditions for social and politi-
cal citizenship. 
Finally, turning to the political problems of a new 
development option, they discuss the different rela-
tionships between the State and the social actors who 
must transform themselves in order to make it possible 
for an alternative project to be developed which in-
cludes not only the contradictions arising from the 
interaction between the rationale of accumulation and 
that of distribution but also the transformation of soci-
ety itself. 
*Mr. Rama is Director of the Division of Social Develop-




1. Internationalization of the domestic market1 
It is generally agreed that the most significant 
phenomenon of dependency during the period 
beginning around 1965 has to do with the fact 
that the economic centre acts not only through its 
control of the import and export system, but also 
through its direct or indirect investments in 
national markets. Since then, in many countries, 
the pace of development has been set by foreign 
investment; one of the most important sectors in 
which this has happened has been the industrial 
sector. 
The presence of foreign capital linked to the 
domestic market was reflected in the strong in-
fluence of the centre over capital movements, as 
well as over basic economic decisions. Moreover, 
although production and marketing took place 
within the sphere of the dependent economy, 
their main effect was to increase the mass of 
capital available for the central economies. By the 
same token, there is no question that investment 
decisions were closely linked to external de-
cisions and pressures. The phenomenon of 
transnationalization significantly influenced the 
reinvestment of profits generated on the nation-
al markets. Corporations had the option of 
choosing to transform their economic benefits 
into capital, which could then be invested in the 
central economies or in dependent economies 
other than those which had generated the prof-
its. 
The expansion of capitalism was also 
affected by the introduction of a style of in-
dustrialization that was based on labour-saving 
technology. In addition, domestic investment 
seemed inadequate, either because the domestic 
'See Cardoso and Faletto (1979). For purposes of anal-
ysis, and in order to give an idea of the complexity of the 
process in Latin American societies, the authors have decided 
to divide their comments into three areas, i.e., the economic, 
the social and the political aspects of dependent societies. The 
authors are aware of the conceptual problems involved in this 
approach, but feel it is the most suited to this attempt to 
reconstruct the scenarios of the crisis of dependency of Latin 
American societies. 
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savings capacity was weak or because the sector 
which should have been accumulating or invest-
ing was more inclined towards consumption. 
These arguments were refuted with the 
allegation that, however real the aforementioned 
problems might be, most of them had originated 
in the contradictions that were inherent to cap-
italist growth, as reflected in the "dependent cap-
italist" form of development. It was noted that the 
existence of contradictions was not an obstacle to 
capitalist development, but rather a condition of 
that development. What was stressed was that, 
given the progressive and cumulative nature of 
the capitalist system, and the price paid for de-
stroying important generations and sectors of 
the exploited classes, the specific feature of this 
system was its capacity to grow in a spiral, 
transforming social relations of production as a 
result of the increases in the level of accumula-
tion and the development of the forces of pro-
duction (Cardoso, 1980a). 
Nevertheless, a simple look at the Latin 
American situation will reveal that several issues 
are involved. The annual growth rate of the GDP 
for the period 1950-1978 was 7.0% for Brazil, 
5.8% for Venezuela, and 5.2% for Mexico; 
however, it was 2.6% for Chile, 2.4% for Argenti-
na and 1.6% for Uruguay. The growth rate of the 
industrial GDP for the same period was 8.5% for 
Brazil, 6.4% for Venezuela, 7.3% for Mexico, 
3.7% for Chile, 4.1% for Argentina and 2.7% for 
Uruguay. In Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, it 
tends to go down or to remain stagnant (Fajnzyl-
ber, 1983). 
As always, when one sees the specific results 
of dependency, one is led to analyse the domestic 
context in which it occurs, since any response to 
the problems of dependent development will de-
pend, to a certain extent, on how the different 
local units are articulated; in other words, one 
must determine what are the specific elements of 
dependency, although this still does not answer 
the question of what dependent capitalism is in 
general. 
Development related to this type of de-
pendency entailed heteronomy and partial de-
velopment —despite the growth of the domestic 
market— and it thus became possible to speak of 
industrialized and dependent peripheral coun-
tries. What is important is that the relationship 
between the national economy and the dynamic 
centres of the central economies was established 
within the domestic market itself. 
In many cases, the new linkage did indeed 
involve the transfer of modern organizational 
systems and production techniques, but this had 
implications for the autonomy of the national 
economic system and development policy de-
cisions. The capital, the techniques and the orga-
nization that were transferred from the centres 
provided a new axis for organizing the national 
economy. It could be said that, in extreme cases, 
the mechanisms for controlling the national 
economy tended to be reduced as a result of 
the imposition of certain norms pertaining to 
the functioning of the international production 
system. This restricted the sphere of action and 
the autonomous decision-making capacity of 
local groups. 
As regards the political aspect, the dominant 
groups found it necessary to reorganize the 
domestic system in order to facilitate the es-
tablishment of the new modality of dependency 
and thus ensure their participation in power. 
a) The controversy about dependency and 
capitalist development 
As was to be expected, the question of de-
pendency (Cardoso, 1980a) gave rise to heated 
controversies about the character of and the pros-
pects for the development process in Latin 
America; many different issues were discussed, 
including that of the viability of capitalist de-
velopment in the periphery. Among the ele-
ments mentioned as structural obstacles to the 
expansion of capitalism were those which limited 
the growth of the domestic market, especially the 
persistence of a restrictive rural structure and the 
growing tendency towards a concentration of in-
come. 
b) Dependent industrialization and 
technological dependency 
Fajnzylber ( 1983) refers to a sort of "cumula-
tive virtuous causation" in which growth, tech-
nical progress and industrialization are all linked 
together. The driving force of this causation is 
said to be the sector producing capital goods, to 
the extent that it is the bearer of technical prog-
ress and influences the productivity of labour 
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and investment and, consequently, the in-
ternational competitiveness of a national econ-
omy. The greater or lesser development of this 
sector is, in Fajnzylber's opinion, what makes the 
difference between an advanced industrialized 
economy and a semi-industrialized one. 
Nonetheless, the difference is not an arbi-
trary phenomenon. Although, as mentioned be-
fore, the new dependency is characterized by 
foreign investment and the presence of foreign 
capital on the domestic market and in the in-
dustrialization process, this does not mean that 
there will be every type of industrialization in 
every case. In terms of the international econ-
omy, the central economies tend to concentrate 
on high-technology sectors, and this means that 
technology is not controlled by the periphery; 
more important, however, is the fact that the 
industries that are set up in Latin America are 
technologically dependent on the more ad-
vanced ones. 
The very existence of technological de-
pendency has several implications. Usually, 
labour-saving technologies are used and this 
obviously affects the absorption of the labour 
force and encourages the dissemination of styles 
of cosumption that follow1 the patterns of the 
international market. Indeed, in the less de-
veloped countries, this type of market is limited 
to certain sectors of the population, i.e., the mid-
dle and higher-income sectors. 
Two phenomena are worth mentioning in 
this respect. The first one has to do with how 
dependent industrialization is related to the econ-
omy as a whole. By its very nature, industrial 
capitalism entails the creation of new economic 
and social relations, i.e., the development of the 
bourgeoisie, the transformation of the middle 
sectors, the emergence and development of the 
proletariat, etc.; this may be seen in several Latin 
American countries. Inherent to it also, however, 
is the capacity to transform the economic system 
as a whole. Nonetheless, this modality of de-
pendent industrialization tends to limit 
transformation to the so-called "privileged con-
sumer society". Moreover, the industrial sector is 
still a sort of satellite of the centre, since the latter, 
through its control over technology also controls 
the dynamics of the former. 
The second aspect has to do with the fact that 
the expansion of the industrial sector no only 
increases technological dependency but usually 
entails a strong financial dependency as well. In 
order to acquire the necessary technology, a 
country must have access to capital and quite 
often, this can only be obtained through external 
credit and indebtedness. The linkage of the 
national entrepreneurial sector with foreign en-
terprises thus tends to be reinforced, since it is 
from the foreign enterprises that the local ones 
obtain the desired technological renovation and, 
particularly, the financing they need in order to 
have access to that technology. 
c) Financial dependency 
There is no need to discuss again the various 
mechanisms which worked together to create a 
strong external dependency on credit, both pub-
lic and private; we have already mentioned the 
relationship between technological dependency 
and indebtedness, but the liquidity of the in-
ternational market, the recirculation of petrodol-
lars and similar events also played a part. Tavares 
(1972, pp. 214 and 215), in referring to the case 
of Brazil, mentions the expansion and di-
versification of debt and credit relationships 
among the more dynamic sectors of the econ-
omy, an expansion which was much greater 
than the growth of the means of payment. What 
happened in Brazil has also happened in many 
others countries. Indebtedness occurred: i) with-
in the private sector (enterprises and con-
sumers), as a result of the indirect intermediation 
of financial enterprises; ii) between the private 
sector and the public sector; iii) between the pri-
vate sector and the exterior, with the heavy influx 
of short-term capital and with public and private 
financial intermediation. 
The same author, basing her arguments on 
Hilferding, describes the effects of the pre-
dominance of financial capitalism on the econ-
omy as a whole. These would be as follows: 
i) Financial accumulation is made possible by 
the creation of fictitious capital through the 
issuance of securities whose value depends on 
speculative transactions, in connection both with 
their issuance and with their circulation on the 
secondary securities markets. 
ii) The functions of the entrepreneur as such 
are separated from those of the capitalist, who 
acquires rights of ownership over the rent pro-
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duced and takes charge of its accumulation. 
Using it as Financial capital, he can either recon-
vert it into productive capital or apply it in more 
profitable sectors, one of which may be the finan-
cial sector itself. 
As the hegemony of financial capital over 
industrial, commercial and bank capital is es-
tablished, there is a greater centralization and, 
consequently, financial capital tends to accentu-
ate the monopolistic bent of capitalism and con-
trol the overall accumulation process. Hence, this 
type of capitalism is speculative in nature, the 
production sector is subordinated and there is a 
trend towards oligopolistic concentration; in 
addition, most of the financial capital usually 
comes from abroad. 
Another important fact is worth mentioning. 
S. Lichtensztejn (1983) stresses that in capitalism, 
the economy evolves from a monetary to a credit 
economy. In this regard, he states, it can be said 
that the financial markets are relatively in-
dependent as regards the amount of money 
needed for mercantile circulation and the 
circulation of rents; on the other hand, they be-
come increasingly dependent as regards the 
needs originating in the circulation, concentra-
tion and centralization of money-capital as such. 
Control over high-powered money, be it pesos, 
cruceiros or dollars, thus becomes an apparent 
and often anachronistic symbol of autonomous 
national monetary power. It is easy to surmise 
what effect this phenomenon has on the State's 
capacity to regulate the economic process. 
2. Structure of dependent 
capitalism and crisis 
There is some consensus that the problems of the 
development of dependent capitalism are closely 
related, on the one hand, to dependency in the 
strict sense of the word, as noted in the areas of 
finance (loans, debt, credit, etc.) and tech-
nological dependency (production goods that 
must be imported). On the other hand, this type 
of capitalism tends to form a domestic market 
which is strongly influenced by the demand of 
the high-income sectors, so that pressure is 
generated for the production structure to be 
geared towards the production of goods that will 
meet that demand; the financial mechanisms 
—credit and others— very often help con-
centrate the supply for trade in the same direc-
tion. To this is added the traditional dependency 
of the export sector. 
Because they are so closely linked to the ex-
terior, the dependent economies are extremely 
vulnerable and any interruption in the process of 
circulation, within the context of the in-
ternationalized economy with which it is in-
tegrated, can affect the entire economy. 
Nevertheless, although vulnerability is in itself an 
important problem, it is not the only one. The 
internal structure of a country often has much to 
do with the particular nature of the crisis it ex-
periences. 
The part that is played by the profit motive in 
a capitalist economy cannot be overlooked. If the 
differences in the profitability of the different 
sectors of the economy are substantial, the logical 
reaction is to transfer capital to the most lucrative 
sector. In many Latin American countries, inter-
est in money as such grew more than the prof-
itability of some sectors of production; capital-
ists withdrew the money they had placed in those 
sectors and reinvestment was thus postponed. 
Factors conducive to crisis were thus generated 
in the production sector; their effect may have 
been concealed somewhat because of the high 
profits gained, particularly in the financial sec-
tor. Moreover, financial speculation, which be-
came international in scope, fostered the massive 
transfer of capital to the exterior. 
Simply stated, financial speculation dis-
courages investment and this leads to crisis. It is 
sometimes thought that depression is the remedy 
for such maladies. Depression, which brings in its 
wake unemployment, a drop in wages and a de-
preciation of capital values (e.g., a decline in the 
value of stocks) can promote reinvestment in the 
production sector, thus reinitiating the cycle. 
It should be borne in mind that the problem 
of lack of profitability in the production sector is 
caused mainly by the cost of money or of equip-
ment and machinery. Financial dependency and 
the internationalization of this sector make it dif-
ficult to act on the value of money; the same may 
be said of technological dependency with respect 
to the value of machinery and equipment. The 
only mechanism on which it is possible to act, 
particularly at the entrepreneurial level, is that of 
wages, but a reduction of wages is fundamentally 
a mechanism used to compensate for the dif-
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ficulty of acting in respect of the other mechan-
isms mentioned above. 
A second aspect of the phenomenon of crisis 
has to do with the longstanding controversy con-
cerning the danger inherent in unplanned capi-
talist production. In Latin America, it was usually 
the State which helped, with its policies, to main-
tain a certain balance between the different sec-
tors of economic activity, or at least tried to cor-
rect the errors and attenuate the effects of the 
disequilibria. During the 1970s, for various 
reasons —some ideological and some relating to 
more structural aspects, such as the increased 
independence of entrepreneurs in respect of 
State policies (an independence gained by having 
direct access to external and domestic credits)— 
the regulatory capacity of the State was di-
minished in many countries. In addition, many 
countries began to use the United States dollar as 
a second currency in their domestic economies. 
Thus, it was very difficult for the State, to imple-
ment, through its monetary policies, measures 
that would act on the economy. Moreover, be-
cause of the magnitude of the dollar area, there 
were many cases in which forced reconversion 
would lead not only to economic conflict but to 
serious political conflict as well. 
Evidently, the problem of making a country's 
economy function is not only one of maintaining 
the necessary balance between different factors 
and components; economic growth also involves 
increasing consumption, constant capital and the 
labour force, to mention only a few of the most 
obvious factors. This means that more means of 
production and of consumption must be pro-
1. Transformation of the social structure. 
Towards a new dualism'? 
In the structural transition of the region, the 
dependent type of development has conditioned 
the capitalist modality of transformation and has 
created social groups that shape both the social 
structure and the power structure. 
duced than those required for replacement. 
When there is no planning, or when the signals of 
the market are confusing, maladjustments be-
tween the different components of the economy 
can lead to friction and untenable contradictions. 
The problem is much more serious when many 
of the decisions which affect the economy are 
made outside the country and are beyond its 
control. 
The problems mentioned above are im-
portant, but it must not be forgotten that the key 
issue in an economy is always that of its potential 
for growth. If the dynamics of Latin American 
capitalism is closely linked to the dynamics of 
central capitalism, one would expect—and some 
do— that the recovery of the centre would make 
it possible to resume the cycle, even though the 
social cost might be high during the recessive 
period. But other, more autonomous options 
may also be considered. One possibility is that 
offered by new forms of insertion in the external 
markets, despite the difficulties this entails. As 
regards the domestic market, it would appear 
that consideration should be given to reorienting 
production with a view to meeting the demand of 
groups which were not favoured under the pre-
vious system, i.e., mainly the popular groups, the 
working class and the middle sectors. This 
obviously presents a great challenge, both be-
cause it becomes necessary to reorient the struc-
ture of production and because the issue of State 
management becomes a crucial one. In addition 
to presenting an economic problem, this presents 
a serious political problem and requires the 
articulation of social groups and classes. 
As a result of the rapid decline of mortality 
and the slow rate at which natality changes (due 
to the persistence of previous cultural patterns), 
the population of the region has doubled during 
the thirty years following 1950. At the same time, 
as a result of production and urban consumption 
patterns and of the impact of capitalism on agri-
cul ture , by 1980, the urban population 
II 
New dependecy, structural transition and social groups 
134 CEPAL REVIEW No. 25 / April 1985 
accounted for two-thirds of the total population. 
The per capita gross domestic product, in 
1970 dollars, rose from US$ 439 in 1950 to 1 007 
in 1980. The growth rate for Central America, 
Bolivia, Haiti and Peru, whose levels had already 
been quite low, was minimal; the Southern Cone 
countries, which had started at a high level, also 
grew at a low rate; Costa Rica, Panama, Vene-
zuela and Mexico experienced a considerable in-
crease, and Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia, start-
ing at low levels, saw their per capita GDP grow 
rapidly. 
During the period 1950-1980, agricultural 
occupations fell from 53.7% to 33.7% of the total 
—even in countries having a high degree of 
urbanization, such as Argentina, where the abso-
lute volumes fell to 14%— while secondary 
occupations rose by seven points and tertiary 
occupations by twelve points (see table). 
At the same time, the participation of man-
ual wage-earners in the transformation industry 
has fallen with respect to that of non-manual 
wage-earners in the secondary and tertiary sec-
tors. In Brazil, the latter increased from 80 to 99 
out of every 100 non-agricultural manual wage-
earners and in Argentina, it rose from 76 to 98. 
In Chile, the figure jumped from 57 to 105 and 
in Peru, from 78 to 160. In some cases, the ex-
planation is to be found in the advance of tech-
nology in the production of durable consumer 
goods; in others, the phenomenon is a specific 
result of policies leading to de-industrialization 
and spurious tertiarization. 
The situation is different in the top occupa-
tional categories. In Brazil, the categories of 
employers, managers, professionals and tech-
nical workers rose from a minimum of 2.2% of 
the entire economically active population in 1950 
to 10% in 1980; in countries having a modern 
employment structure, such as Argentina, they 
rose from 12.2% to 15.6%. 
These changes have gone hand in hand with 
the expansion of secondary and higher educa-
tion, which has been influenced by the dynamics 
of the economy and the gains made by certain 
social groups. In 1960, 1.6% of the population 
between 20 and 24 years of age was enrolled in 
universities; in 1980, one out of every six young 
people was a student. The structural transforma-
tion has been very different from one country to 
another, but in no case were poverty and 
marginality eliminated. Fifty percent of the pop-
ulation lived in poverty in 1960 and in 1980,35% 
were still poverty stricken, despite the fact that 
the per capita GDP had almost doubled during 
that time. 
Policies aimed at raising income through 
wages did not reach large strata of the informal 
sector; peasants living on minifundio, and occa-
sional wage-earners continued to live in poverty 
and their relative standing fell; when they even-
tually entered modern production sectors, they 
did so in unskilled occupations producing ex-
tremely low incomes. The same exclusion pre-
vailed in respect of education: the illiteracy of 
rural youth and little schooling (devoid of true 
educational content) of their urban counterparts 
tended to reinforce the segregation caused by 
cultural barriers. 
2. The marginal sector. A reserve army or a 
condition of social reproduction? 
The controversy about the meaning of marginal-
ity has been widely discussed in Latin America 
and we need not go into it again here. It is in-
teresting, however, to recall the comments made 
by F.H. Cardoso (1980b) concerning the 
relationship between marginality and accumula-
tion, particularly if the notion of marginality is 
extended to cover all sectors not directly con-
nected with the modern sector. Cardoso points 
out that under certain conditions, an abundance 
of cheap labour can affect accumulation; this 
argument can even be used by certain sectors to 
attract investors. Nevertheless, capitalist expan-
sion depends not only on competition among 
workers, but also on the cost of reproducing the 
labour force, on profitability, on competition 
among capitalists and on technological renova-
tion. He also states that in order for marginality 
to bring down the cost of replacement, not only 
must its magnitude force a worker to accept paid 
work at around the minimum cost of reproduc-
tion (a normal function of reserve armies), but 
also this cost must depend on his being able to 
make a living outside the industrial capitalist sys-
tem. Thus, the existence of production for con-
sumption outside the system can help lower the 
cost of replacing the labour force. 
What is important is how social and produc-
tion structures are articulated with each other. 
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Source: EAP data according to social-occupational strata for the years 1950 and 1970 were taken from Filgueira and Geneletti (1981), table 2, pp. 32 etseq. Date 
for 1980 were taken from special survey and census tables (Chile, Panama, Brazil, Ecuador) and from household census data publications (Argentina, Costa 
Rica, Peru). Non-manual EAP include: a) employers; b) public and private managers and administrative staff; c) independent professionais and technical 
workers; d) dependent professionals and technical workers; e) own-account in commerce; f) office workers, salespeople and similar categories. Secondary and 
tertiary non-manual wage earners include: b), d), f). Secondary and tertiary non-manual own-account workers include: a), c) e), Secondary manual wage-earners include: 
craftsmen, machine operators, labourers and day workers in industry, construction and utilities. 
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Only thus can the notion of dualism without rela-
tions be overcome; as Cardoso himself points 
out, that is how the question of social and political 
transformation in the periphery should be dealt 
with. Modes of articulation between the marginal 
and the modern sectors of the labour force are 
not the same when one moves from a global 
interpretation to an analysis of the specific fea-
tures of the type ofdependent development pre-
vailing in a particular country, since the marginal 
sector is defined by contrasting it with the articu-
lated sector of the dependent economy, and 
hence depends on what the latter is like. 
At one extreme are the sectors that have been 
expelled from the system, as is the case in Chile, 
where unemployment transformed labourers 
and independent producers into pobladores, i.e., 
résidents of deteriorating urban areas which are 
currently characterized not so much by their de-
ficient ecological conditions and services as by the 
unemployment problem they face. At the other 
extreme are rural migrants, who, with little or no 
education, have been partially incorporated into 
urban life in occupations requiring very few skills 
and at wages that are not sufficient to insure 
social reproduction; they are defined not so 
much by the fact that they are engaged in mar-
ginal or informal occupations as by the fact that 
they are exploited. For the same reason, they fall 
into the so-called categories of underemploy-
ment, defined in terms of the low income of those 
concerned; hence, the issue of employment is not 
properly distinguished from the issue of ex-
ploitation. 
The data for Brazil around 1980, which cov-
er both occupation in modern sectors and in 
other minimum-income sectors, provide a good 
example of this. In the intermediate positions, 
there are many cases in which the inability of the 
economic system to incorporate the urban mas-
ses into the modern production and services 
sector goes hand-in-hand with the prevailing 
cultural dualism (indigenous language, rural 
origin, lack of education), thus making it impos-
sible for the members of this sector to enter the 
regular job market. 
3. The modern social structure 
This is made up of a number of groups which 
participate in modern production activities and 
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services, have access to the new type of consump-
tion generated in dependent development and 
whose relationships with each other follow a strat-
ified pattern. 
a) The bourgeoisie 
The predominance of t ransnational 
monopolistic capital creates a dependent nation-
al bourgeoisie, which adopts the production 
rationale, as well as the values and consumption 
patterns of those who represent this capital. Pre-
dictions that transnationalization would bring 
about the virtual disappearence of the national 
bourgeoisie have not been fulfilled. In some 
cases, the national bourgeoisie competes for con-
trol over the larger enterprises; its own activity 
has been internationalized and, at minor con-
sumption levels, it has become linked to the in-
ternational bourgeoisie through exports. 
At the same time, in those countries where 
the State is ruled by a bureaucracy of "estates", or 
"political" bureaucracy, which makes it a centre 
of power in itself, a State bourgeoisie develops 
which manages public enterprises as if they were 
private ones. By the same token, the bourgeoisie, 
merging with the oligarchy, behaves in a specula-
tive manner. The speculation begins with urban 
land and the situation is now similar to that which 
prevailed during the speculative crisis of the 
nineteenth century, when the State became the 
private domain of speculators and the neoliberal 
school of economics was developed. 
The internationalization of Latin American 
financial circuits had its counterpart in the 
emigration of capital to the central countries; in 
this case, the attraction was security rather than 
profit. This meant the internationalization of 
certain sectors of the bourgeoisie which do not 
consider themselves linked with national proj-
ects. 
b) The middle sectors 
These sectors were formed during the pro-
cess ofdependent capitalist transformation. This 
does not mean that the original groups dis-
appeared, but rather that they underwent 
changes or became less important within society 
as a whole. 
i) Independent or residual workers. The per-
centage of non-manual independent workers has 
DEPENDENT SOCIETIES AND CRISIS IN LATIN AMERICA / Germán W. Rama and Enzo Fatetto 137 
declined throughout the region —regressing 
during the 1970s in Argentina, Chile and Peru— 
and in some countries, such as Brazil, there is 
only one for every four non-manual wage-
earners. Threatened by the growth of the State 
and of the large economic organizations, losing 
in status vis-à-vis the educated technical middle 
sectors, affected in some countries by consump-
tion levels of the modern labour sectors, their 
social behaviour is similar to that of the Pou-
jadistes. Specifically, they support and promote 
authoritarian solutions, particularly if these re-
introduce the social hierarchy; they also support 
certain populist movements which tend to ex-
pand the consumer market, and, on the whole, 
they react negatively towards the modernization 
of capitalism and society, particulary as regards 
its cultural aspects and those pertaining to 
scientific and technological rationalization. 
ii) Dependent workers or wage-earners. This 
group has grown considerably and new strata 
have appeared within it. The first of these de-
veloped as the administrative functions of the 
State increased and commercial services for an 
expanding urban consumption were developed. 
As regards their educational and social profile, 
the members of these strata are not very dif-
ferent from the independent middle sectors; 
among others, this group includes minor officials 
of the growing populist State and persons work-
ing in sales. The second developed as a result of 
the expansion of social and community services, 
particularly in the area of education and health, 
and is made up of persons who have completed 
their secondary and higher education. Their 
orientation and behaviour are determined more 
by their educational socialization than by their 
social origin and most of them have only recently 
come into the middle sectors. In countries where 
industrialization is weaker and social integration 
policies stronger (Costa Rica, Peru), they are the 
largest and most organized group of non-manual 
wage-earners, and in most countries they repre-
sent more than 25% of State employees. As ser-
vices expand, wages fall, and the cadres of social 
workers are gradually feminized, this phe-
nomenon affects their role in politics. 
These groups will, and in some cases already 
do, play a very important role at the ideological 
level, because through them the intellectual and 
political culture of the universities is extended to 
all the middle sectors. This process is a cyclical 
one: firstly, there are great expectations of social 
transformation, with a major role being assigned 
to the State, based on populist and social reform 
movements; secondly, there is disappointment 
and the political vanguards adopt ideologies 
ranging from opposition to the status quo to rev-
olutionary mobilization for total change in soci-
ety, and from anticapitalist trends characteristic 
of the independent middle sectors to peasant-
intellectual and worker-intellectual alliances for 
the establishment of some type of popular social-
ist model. Finally, there is a third stage in which 
ideological and professional roles tend to merge 
parallel to the constitution of national political 
options embodied in parties having a reformist 
or social democratic orientation, where they 
again play a part in promoting change, in con-
nection with the rationalization of the services in 
which they act. Their vanguards turn into 
strategic groups which, within the sector, mobi-
lize without producing new social breakdowns, 
and, within the social system, establish negotia-
tions with parties and social groups with a view to 
reaching agreement on the functioning of the 
system so as to articulate individual interests with 
the general interest of society. 
The third stratum is established with the 
emergence and growth of technical and scientific 
cadres. As regards their educational back-
ground, the members of this stratum have usual-
ly studied in technical and scientific fields. Their 
intellectual frame of reference is beginning to be 
the same as that of the corresponding sectors in 
the developed countries and they follow —either 
through their scientific or technical contacts or 
through the international markets— the orienta-
tions prevailing in those countries as regards effi-
ciency, functional specialization, the require-
ments of rational organization, the concept of the 
State as a social articulator and agent of develop-
ment, the importance of creating conditions con-
ducive to freedom of initiative and innovation. 
Especially in the case of the business-related sec-
tors, they are conservative as regards ideology 
and they follow international patterns of con-
sumption. 
Where transnational monopolistic capital 
and dependent local capital have prevailed, the 
middle classes were usually displaced to the posi-
tion of a supporting class. They did not play a 
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significant role in the higher ranks of State man-
agement and their bargaining capacity, which in 
other situations had ensured them a considerable 
part of the national income, declined. In any 
event, their solidarity with the system was some-
times decisive, and was often achieved through 
mechanisms which enabled them to satisfy their 
consumerist demands. 
Nonetheless, in other cases —especially 
when there was a political party system which 
enabled them to be represented in gov-
ernment— the middle sectors did not lose their 
importance. Moreover, they did not always seek 
purely material advantages, as their behaviour 
was also determined by other values and this 
in turn determined their allegiance to a given 
political system. 
The speed at which the make up of the mid-
dle sectors changed, as well as the radical dif-
ferences of orientation among social systems 
during this period of structural transition, ex-
plain why the middle sectors generated or sup-
ported political movements ranging from fascist-
type to fundamentalist revolutionary move-
ments, from democratic conservative alliances 
with the bourgeoisie to democratic change-
oriented alliances with the proletariat. The cycle 
has not yet been completed and the fact that 
there is such a variety of national situations —as 
regards social structure and power rela-
tionships— is an indication that many different 
political behaviours which will vary depending 
on the country concerned, are yet to be expected, 
especially in view of the reactions of fear and 
threat generated by the current economic crisis. 
c) The industrial proletariat 
During the period under consideration, the 
absolute volume of the active population in the 
secondary sector tripled and its share in the total 
EAP increased considerably. This in itself 
changed the role which the labour sector had 
played during the populist periods of the 1950s, 
when political processes took place in urban en-
claves set in a rural world, and behavioural pat-
terns were related to those of other urban groups 
in which independent middle sectors or minor 
officials were predominant. At the same time, 
production evolved from small-scale crafts or 
factories to large, technologically advanced en-
terprises. 
The educational profile of workers, particu-
larly those of the large economic organizations, 
changed radically (craftsmen and small factory 
workers having lost their usefulness with the ad-
vent of modern technology), and the ecological 
and cultural isolation of worker populations grad-
ually disappeared as they became integrated 
into the culture of the modern world. In in-
dustrial enterprises, there was a steady increase 
in the percentage of personnel doing administra-
tive, technical, scientific, sales and public rela-
tions work, while at the same time internal 
career-development mechanisms did away with 
the isolation of workers from other social groups, 
such as those studied by Halbwachs at the be-
ginning of the century. Many trade unions, at 
both the factory and the sectoral levels, include 
office workers as well as labourers and tech-
nicians. This is facilitated by cultural com-
munication among them, by their common prob-
lems as regards working conditions and by the 
fact that the trade unions are concerned both 
with immediate conditions and with the formula-
tion of proposals concerning the organization of 
society. Independent action by trade unions goes 
hand-in-hand with their capacity to work with 
other social groups in formulating political proj-
ects. 
T h e p r o d u c t i v e and technological 
heterogeneity which characterizes Latin Amer-
ican industry and the impact which the industrial 
transnational corporations have had on it have 
accentuated a process which leads not so much to 
a differentiation of production as to heterogene-
ity (if not segmentation) of the various units mak-
ing up the industrial and economic system. 
Hence, the very concept of the working class 
seems somewhat outdated; one can at least point 
to a division between a new working class whose 
members are engaged in advanced technological 
activities and work in satellite companies belong-
ing to large conglomerates, and another working 
class composed of workers of smaller-scale com-
panies using inferior technology and traditional 
production methods. The latter group is made 
up of a less educated proletariat, trained through 
on-the-job apprenticeship and scattered 
throughout a large number of small-scale enter-
prises, who receive much lower wages than the 
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proletariat working with advanced technologies. 
These phenomena pose the question of the 
worker's identity, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, the question of the worker's political 
articulation with the social system. As regards the 
First question, because the wide variety of situa-
tions involved makes it very difficult to mobilize 
workers in terms of common demands, trade 
unions that are organized according to activity 
sector or enterprise are able to act with greater 
flexibility than large centralized ones. As regards 
the second question, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to speak of the working class as a priv-
ileged and dominant actor of social transforma-
tion; the Latin American society has not been a 
predominantly proletarian one and will not be-
come proletarian because of the technological 
stage in which its industrialization is taking place. 
Consequently, projects for organizing society on 
the basis of the working class will either represent 
some isolated action amounting to an imposition 
on society or will involve the establishment of 
pluralistic agreements with groups from the mid-
dle sectors and others originating in the mod-
ernization of agriculture. 
The dependent capitalist growth model was 
based on a high-income type of market which, to 
a large extent, worked against populist demands. 
To the sectors or groups in power, even the 
possibility of involvement by the popular sectors 
jeopardized the operation of the system. The 
policy of containing wages which was applied 
often, usually called for repressive control of 
trade-union organizations. An effort was made 
to restrict their action to purely bureaucratic, 
administrative and welfare functions; neverthe-
less, this curtailment of trade unions also entailed 
risks for the dominant sector, inasmuch as, in the 
event of a conflict, legal regulatory mechanisms 
could quickly be set aside. 
It should be borne in mind that the conflict of 
the popular sectors, and particularly of the work-
er groups, is not always only a matter of protest-
ing against excessively severe economic con-
ditions. These movements are often headed by 
worker groups whose own economic situation is 
not so bad, but who demand better working con-
ditions and some degree of participation, not 
only in the enterprise but in society as well. What 
is interesting is that in the type of conflict they 
initiate, they find no one with whom they can 
have a valid dialogue; consequently, they find no 
channels through which to settle the problem. 
Because power is inflexible, any conflict has 
general political implication and thus other 
groups, equally frustrated by the lack of channels 
of participation, also join the fray. 
4. New dependency and power structure 
The relationship between the new forms of de-
pendency and the political and social power sys-
tem has been viewed in terms of the au-
thoritarian-bureaucratic State as initially de-
scribed by Guillermo O'Donell and other authors 
who adopted and followed up on this concept. 
Although this approach was originally based on a 
limited number of experiences, the idea was put 
forth that there was a close correspondence be-
tween a given economic form and a given politi-
cal form. Whether or not this broad generaliza-
tion is valid, one can agree on the significance of 
three main actors, i.e., the transnational corpo-
rations, the local bourgeoisies associated with 
them and the State. 
As regards the State, what is important is the 
role it played as an organization and, con-
sequently, as a bureaucracy; in addition, howev-
er, it often acted as an enterprise in the produc-
tion sector, thus turning into a sui generis type of 
capitalist State or perhaps, in certain circum-
stances, fostering a State capitalism. One im-
portant aspect was the State's capacity to serve 
the interests of large capital, both multinational 
and local; the strong presence of these capitals 
and their relationship with the State gave rise to a 
phenomenon whereby politics was displaced by 
economics and often economics was the only 
politics. Hence, in the opinion of those who have 
studied the phenomenon, the State appears to 
have been almost like an executive committee of 
the dominât sectors, i.e., State officials (military 
or civil), executives of State enterprises, large 
private entrepreneurs, both national and for-
eign, and the new middle classes linked to 
those enterprises. 
In some countries, the presence of bank and 
financial capital was more evident; under official 
policies, these groups were granted all kinds of 
royalties and facilities. In many cases, because of 
the limitations imposed on organized parties and 
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major trends of opinion, or their virtual exclu-
sion, the State became an almost direct spokes-
man for the interest groups mentioned. 
Perhaps one of the most important phe-
nomena of the new power structure was the 
1. The failure to establish 
a modern political.system 
An analysis differentiating the economic system 
from the political system is particularly valid in 
Latin America, because there are inconsistencies 
between the two dimensions: to a large extent, 
capitalist forms penetrate the society from out-
side, whereas in the political sphere, the con-
tradictions of the crisis of the oligarchy are not 
resolved in such a way as to allow for the develop-
ment of capitalistic class relations. Dependency 
and the projection of historical structures are 
variables in the constitution of an incomplete 
bourgeois order whose political expression has 
two main elements, i.e., a State which is not a 
construction of society, and the lack of political 
resolution of the crisis of the oligarchy. 
a) A State which is not a 
construction of society 
Historically, in the construction of society 
and the State in Latin America, the State first 
appeared as a substitute for Portuguese or Span-
ish imperial power. In the case of Brazil, imperial 
domination persisted well into the nineteenth 
century and its counterpart in society was the 
slave-and-master system. In countries with a sub-
jugated indigenous population, the local oligar-
chy retained its power, and dominated the pop-
ulation through the hacienda system and the 
linguistic exclusion of the people under their 
control. Finally, in countries having a free pop-
ulation, the struggle for national construction 
ended with the imposition of the State and the 
oligarchy. 
This imposition of the State on a society that 
strong and often decisive influence of the armed 
forces. The behaviour of the military may be 
mainly accounted for by their concern with sub-
version, but their intervention is associated with 
the crisis between the State and society. 
is not able to organize itself or express itself was 
the model which continued in force up to the 
mid-twentieth century, except in those countries 
in which the commodity-export stage went hand-
in-hand with national ownership of the means of 
production and a shortage of labour which made 
it necessary to resort to international migrations 
of free men. 
b) The lack of political resolution 
of the crisis of the oligarchy 
The crisis which began during the 1930s had 
a decisive impact on the economic model of 
domination by the oligarchy. Capitalist forms 
gradually emerged, leading eventually to the in-
ternationalization of the Latin American markets 
and to the new forms of dependency which 
characterize the current crisis. Despite all this, 
the social power and the values which legitimated 
the previous domination by the oligarchy did not 
entirely disappear. 
Capitalism developed within the context of a 
crisis of the oligarchy which in some countries 
has lasted for half a century. The bourgeoisie, as 
a class, has not had a rationalizing influence on 
capitalist expansion, disseminated values rela-
ting to accumulation and distribution or de-
veloped a capacity to stabilize the political system 
with a hegemony that would legitimate an 
alliance of power. 
The bourgeois sectors opted for different 
forms of political construction such as populism, 
reformism or reconstruction of the oligarchy. In 
the First two cases, they tried to establish an 
articulation between the society and the State by 
means of a political system in which the society 
was to take part in orienting the development 
III 
The political crisis 
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system and establish a social and legal order, as 
well as a collective identity of belonging to the 
nation; this involved the dissemination of new 
values in respect of personal equality and rights, 
as well as a common culture. Populism stressed 
the creation of a social citizenship, understood as 
a set of social rights that are the same for the 
entire population, without any distinction being 
made between different social levels; to this end, 
policies relating to the distribution of social in-
comes —education, health, social security— pro-
vides for the transferal to the collective popula-
tion of an increasing share of the family costs of 
social reproduction. Reformism, on the other 
hand, stressed political citizenship. This included 
the extension of suffrage and its use as a mecha-
nism for the society to regulate the State, the es-
tablishment or extension of a common legislation 
to all members of the society and the develop-
ment of mechanisms for preventing the State 
from acting illegally or using its power arbitrarily 
(justice, autonomy, separation of powers). 
For the purposes of this analysis, we shall 
stress two characteristics of these options: 
i) Groups of the bourgeoisie take part in.both 
processes; in populism, they participate along 
with urban worker or popular sectors, and in 
reformism, with middle sectors. Nonetheless, 
neither of these can define itself because of the 
control exercised by the bourgeoisie itself. 
ii) These processes only brought a part of 
society (urban residents who took part in the 
newly emerging activities) into modern social re-
lations and often did so in a corporate manner. 
For the remaining (majority) population—a fun-
damentally rural one— there was no such thing 
as social a'nd political rights. Such rights con-
tinued to be controlled and repressed through 
the classical procedures of the oligarchical 
republic; hence, a double standard was applied 
in relations between the State and the two forms 
of society. In many countries of the region, the 
oligarchy managed to retain its control over the 
State well into the second half of this century; in 
thers, it influenced the orientation of society by 
managing rural society and the less developed 
egions. It provided a point of reference for the 
ititudes of the bourgeoisie, on the one hand, 
i id, on the other, it reintroduced its regressive 
projects into populist and mesocratic alliances. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the gradual 
urbanization of society, the changing levels of 
education of the population, and its social mobil-
ity, the oligarchy no longer had a population it 
could fit neatly into a frame. The bourgeoisie, for 
its part, noting that most groups had been in-
tegrated into modern life, found in the oligar-
chical points of reference and neoliberal 
economic models the way to exercise exclusive 
dominace. The State was once again separated 
from society, but this time, given the develop-
ment and mobilization of society, the State's 
relationship to the society became an adversary 
one. 
2. The contradictions of the political process 
The present crisis of dependent economies, 
although widespread throughout the region, is 
superimposed on and intertwined with the wide-
ly varying crises of the political and social systems 
of Latin America; hence, the future scenarios will 
necessarily be quite different from one country 
to another. 
Without claiming to cover every possible 
situation, the following examples show some of 
the different situations that arise in the region. 
a) The crisis in modern societies2 
In the Sourthern Cone countries, where the 
economic crisis has been more serious and where 
the neoliberal economic model was applied 
more forcefully, the breakdown between the 
society and State occurred sooner. It is reflected 
in the disintegration of relations between de-
velopment and modernization, participation and 
nationhood, which constituted the variables of 
its historical process. 
As the cycle of urbanization and incorpora-
tion of the various groups into the cultural 
aspects of modern life —education, com-
munications, symbolic participation— was com-
pleted and the cycle of horizontal mobility and 
structural change was concluded, there arose a 
conflict between accumulation and distribution 
and a crisis in connection with the incorporation 
of previously excluded groups or those which 
2
 Part of this analysis takes up the positions expounded 
by Delich {1983) and Oszlak (1983). 
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had no capacity for autonomous political action 
within the political system. 
As social citizenship became generalized, the 
bourgeoisie seemed to have exhausted its capac-
ity to manage incorporation through the refor-
mist and populist options, as well as its capacity 
for economic development, which it did not suc-
ceed in activating through the adoption of tech-
nology and the expansion of the external and 
domestic markets. Thus, «joined the oligarchical 
groups in its traditional resistance to the idea of 
the State representing society (Alfonsfn, 1980). 
In Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, there was 
an attempt at transformation from above; thus, 
the State, which had been put into private hands 
by those groups, was separated from society, sup-
pressed political life, suspended most of the pre-
vious norms and established the will of the au-
thority. It curtailed the functions of the judicial 
system as a protector of the civil society and used 
special agencies to impose the power of the State. 
At the same time, it attempted to dissolve the 
system of values which had previously es-
tablished the link between the State and society 
—i.e., the nation— replacing it by a market. The 
educational system —often viewed as an agent of 
subversion because of its role in mobilizing and 
promoting the autonomy of social groups—, and 
a policy of breaking apart the health and social 
security systems were also used to dissolve social 
citizenship. The State adopted the principle of 
subsidiarity and declared that the market would 
regulate social assignments, thus restoring a 
hierarchical system of classes and groups. The 
dissolution of the social contract —mentioned by 
Oszlak— provided the basis for an unregulated 
market in which the orientation of production, 
entrepreneurial behaviour, accumulation and 
the rationale of capitalism disappeared. Legal 
and economic standards were affected consider-
ably. Speculation as a form of economic appro-
priation was often due to appropriation by the 
State. 
b) The crisis in traditional societies3 
The cases of Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru illus-
trate the continuity of an oligarchical colonial 
3
 This pari takes into account the work done by Cotler 
(1983). 
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heritage reinforced by the segmentation of the 
indigenous population. The oligarchy was not 
able to establish the State, to achieve economic 
growth, to articulate the territory into a market 
system or even to integrate the population into a 
national society. 
Under such circumstances, the bourgeoisie 
did not develop, either at the end of the 
nineteenth century or at the beginning of this 
century, except in certain mining and agricultur-
al export activities which operated in an enclave 
situation. The weakness of social structures in-
creased external dependency; this in turn streng-
thened the social demand for nation-building, 
which was reflected in military sectors in terms of 
the frustrations caused by national wars (e.g., the 
Chaco and Pacific wars, the loss of the Ecuadoran 
Amazon region). This gave rise to certain mili-
tary interventions aimed at achieving national in-
tegration by simultaneously modernizing the 
State and society. This other type of revolution 
from above involved mobilizing the society in 
order to transform it, blocking the old oligarchi-
cal power structure, and avoiding external de-
pendency. 
The subordinate classes are not constituted 
as such; the urban middle classes are of the tradi-
tional type, the industrial proletariat is minimal 
in size, the peasantry is mostly indigenous, and it 
is only in Bolivia that the mining sector is in-
volved in politics. 
The prevailing orientation is a populist one, 
sometimes under military leadership, and it will 
be stronger when the integration capacity of the 
economic system is weaker and the bourgeoisie 
less significant. 
The economic crisis of the 1980s has occur-
red in societies whose development processes 
have led to widely differing results. In one case, a 
country's petroleum resources, together with its 
capitalistic export-oriented agriculture, have en-
abled the State to become a major agent of 
change. The State is able to develop large de-
pendent middle sectors, create a new industrial 
proletariat and consolidate a bourgeoisie of 
strong oligarchical content. Despite the efforts at 
national and cultural integration, there are still 
dualities, the most important of which is the in-
digenous one. The political system articulates the 
modernized society and the State, and gives rise 
to the confrontation between the mesocratic re-
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formist option, the populist option and the 
bourgeois neoliberal option. 
In a second society, the weakness of the 
economic structure, along with the reluctance of 
the oligarchy and the bourgeoisie to go along 
with a State-directed development process, led 
initially to the failure of this process and, sub-
sequently, to their regaining control of the State 
apparatus so as to bring it in line with a neoliberal 
model which led to the disintegration of the econ-
omy and of society. There is a crisis with respect 
to the social incorporation of a mobilized society 
which is more readily defined in terms of the 
people than in terms of class, and which, through 
the political system, promotes State control and a 
model for development, modernization and 
national integration in which survival itself is at 
stake, given the other type of crisis which in turn 
affects the indigenous society. Finally, because of 
its unique history, the third society has an in-
complete class structure. The national popular 
revolution eliminated the oligarchy and a mining 
bourgeoisie that was small in size but had in-
ternational economic dimensions. Workers and 
peasants, biased by their indigenous identity, be-
came either supporters or antagonists of a very 
weak State which was articulated by the military 
or political bureaucracies. As it grew, the 
bourgeoisie still did not manage to control the 
State and the political system reflects the fragile 
alliances of a society undergoing a process of 
revolution, whose adversary in the international 
capitalist system, and which, on the domestic 
scene, has not succeeded in making the State the 
agent of accumulation. 
c) The affirmation of the State and of 
the capitalist system4 
In the case of Brazil, there were several 
structural conditions which made the State the 
articulator of a capitalist development which 
postponed the conflicts between State and society 
and provided certain channels for working them 
out. 
i) This is the only case in Latin America 
where the European type of State persisted and 
4
 This part takes into account the studies by Cardoso 
(1971,1975 and 1983), Faria (1983), Filgueira (1983), Castro 
and others (1983). 
where the old régime, with its monarchical gov-
ernment and slave base continued to the end of 
the nineteenth century. From the beginning, the 
State was not oligarchical but bureaucratic in na-
ture; it had to face the problem of how to control 
an enormous social space with centrifugal 
tendencies, and resorted to a system of reaching 
agreements with local powers while at the same 
time promoting national integration based on 
the restoration of popular cultural forms along 
with political exclusion and exclusion in the area 
of income. 
ii) The crisis of the 1930s affected domina-
tion, but in a society which was overwhelmingly 
rural and in which participation in the electoral 
process was minimal, the import-substitution 
process was carried out under a populist option 
which was limited to the central and southern 
cities and was strongly influenced both by the 
oligarchy and by a stratified State bureaucracy. 
iii) Substitutionary industrialization and the 
export-oriented industrialization which followed 
it still excluded the rural and urban masses while 
at the same time the consumption capacity of the 
integrated urban sector was increasing. The 
bourgeoisie, which developed along with agra-
rian capital, followed the lines of the revolution 
from the State, which had been carried out by the 
groups comprising the State, with military sup-
port, for the purpose of promoting capitalism 
through the internationalization of the market 
and the massive incorporation of technology. 
The triad composed of private capitalism, in-
ternational capitalism and the State operated 
around the latter, which set the boundaries of the 
three entrepreneurial sectors (public activities 
are also entrepreneurial). The "bureaucratic 
rings" (mentioned by Cardoso) gave rise to 
agreements and tension among the three sectors 
and these were sometimes accentuated by the 
bureaucracy's trend towards State capitalism. 
iv) With the populist and reformist options 
out of the picture, social integration was de-
termined by the very high rate at which the rural 
and urban marginal masses were incorporated 
into the modern sector; although their wages 
were very low, the increase in the product 
brought about an improvement in their income, 
their motivation being social mobility. The mid-
dle classes grew and, by way of their consumption 
habits, were incorporated as a body. 
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v) The model which prevailed was a sort of 
State ideology which led to political demobiliza-
tion and brought about integration by means of 
structural mobility and bourgeois consumer val-
ues. It achieved a very effective symbolic integra-
tion by bringing together the nationalized ele-
ments of popular culture and a nationalism 
based on the historical destiny of a country that 
had become an industrial power. 
vi) The relationships between the society and 
the State are now different. The scope of tradi-
tional control and management mechanisms has 
been narrowed as traditional society itself has 
been sharply reduced. (In 1950, the agricultural 
EAP was 60% ofthe total EAP; in 1980, not only 
had it fallen to 31 %, but it had also been affected 
by modernization.) In the modern society, the 
differentiation of classes and groups is one which 
is characteristic of advanced capitalism and calls 
for State control and a development policy aimed 
at fostering the growth of capitalism; this in-
volves social and political citizenship and a dynam-
ics of accumulation and distribution. The 
choice is between continuing with the separation 
of State and society, whereby only the bureaucra-
tic —bourgeois— multinational rings would op-
erate, and promoting societal action whereby the 
State would be controlled by a bourgeois-
mesocratic alliance with proletarian support. 
d) The State as an agent of social 
political consensus 
The cases of Mexico, Costa Rica and Vene-
zuela are especially interesting because these 
countries have shown a remarkable capacity to 
carry out transitions and make corrections in the 
development process without causing as ex-
tensive a breakdown ofthe political system as has 
been noted in other countries. What is particular-
ly interesting is the role that has been played by 
the State, both in the sphere of economics and in 
the search for mechanisms —political or other-
wise— to ensure effective articulation between 
the different social groups. This does not mean 
that there are no conflicts, but rather that they 
have been resolved, thus ensuring the stability of 
the system. 
Although foreign participation in the econ-
omy has been substantial in all three cases, the 
State as such has played a strong role in entrepre-
neurial activity, particularly in national private 
enterprise. In Mexico, for example, most of the 
large State enterprises are involved in credit, 
(e.g., the very important Nacional Financiera), 
utilities (telephone, electricity) or infrastructure 
(steel production). Consequently, the State does 
not compete with the private sector. 
In the case of Venezuela, the fact that the 
State controls petroleum, steel and other im-
portant items clearly makes it the most important 
direct producer of the economy, although its 
activity is associated with the private sector. It has 
also promoted industry and agriculture, 
encouraging the private sector. The purpose 
and, to a great extent, the achievement of the 
agrarian reform was to generate a middle agra-
rian sector which, moreover, would provide a 
good base for political stability. 
In Costa Rica, since the early 1950s, the State 
has played an important role in the diversifica-
tion of the economy, creating infrastructure in 
the areas of energy, roads and social welfare. 
With the nationalization of the banking sector, 
credit was directed to new sectors, such as in-
dustry, which were favoured by subsidized rates, 
soft credit and tariff protection. Moreover, the 
policy has been to support the middle agrarian 
sectors, which are a unique feature of Costa Rica 
not only with respect to other Central American 
countries but also with respect tò the Latin Amer-
ican region as a whole. Most analysts agree that 
the existence of an agrarian middle class is a 
factor of stability in the social and political 
environment of Costa Rica. 
In all three cases, the State has become a 
significant source of employment and has con-
tributed, with its policies, towards a broad 
redistribution of income, although this is more 
true of Venezuela and Costa Rica than of Mexico, 
whose rural area still presents problems in this 
respect. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile noting that 
in all three countries, the State has attached spe-
cial importance to social policies, particularly in 
the areas of education, health and, to a certain 
extent, housing. 
Obviously, there is a close association be-
tween the role of the State and the political sys-
tem prevailing in the three countries. Most for-
eign observers find the Mexican system not ohly 
un ique , but also somewhat mysterious. 
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Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that political 
pluralism has been somewhat limited and that 
the opposition usually functions merely as sym-
bolic competition, although this situation has 
changed somewhat in the last few years. The real 
competition takes place within the government 
party, not necessarily among the blocks compos-
ing it (the peasant block, the worker block and 
the popular block)5 but rather among the sectors 
following individual leaders. It is well know that 
there is usually a complicated mechanism of 
negotiation and balance among the different 
groups, which neither annihilate nor eliminate 
each other, but rather seek some form of com-
promise. The result is an intricate system of 
agreements, relationships and compensations. 
Venezuela's political system began in 1959. 
At first, there were serious problems, including 
outbursts of violence, such as guerrilla attacks. 
Nevertheless, a laborious system of political 
agreements was developed which brought about 
the establishment of a virtual two-party system, 
which does not, however, exclude other parties. 
In some areas of the country, in fact, orientations 
other than those of the two dominant parties are 
very well represented and have a significant 
amount of power. It would appear that the coun-
If under the new development option the social 
actors are considered to be the popular sectors, 
the working class, the middle sectors and part of 
the bourgeoisie, the challenge is how to bring 
together the interests of these groups, which are 
often corporate in nature, in an option that will 
allow for consensus, if not of all the groups con-
cerned, at least of a large majority. Essentially, 
democracy synthesizes the interests of the con-
sensus groups of society. 
One fact is undeniable: we are dealing with 
capitalist societies which are characterized by an 
5
 In the terminology of the Mexican Institutional Rev-
olutionary Party (PRI), the popular block is made up of the 
middle sectors and the bourgeoisie. 
try's oil income explains everything; it is im-
portant, however, to bear in mind the political 
context in which this income is used. The State 
invests in basic sectors but enters into association 
with or encourages private groups, it makes ex-
penditures to transfer income to the poorer sec-
tors, redistributes income through wages and 
services, uses agricultural credit to the benefit of 
small and medium-sized farmers and applies 
broad employment policies. In brief, the forma-
tion of a social consensus is a basic principle. 
Something similar has happened in Costa Rica, 
where the State plays an important economic role 
and where its main concern is to construct the 
bases for social political consensus. 
In brief, the cases mentioned above are in-
teresting because they demonstrate a capacity to 
produce social consensus, for which State action 
has been fundamental. This policy has often 
been attributed to the availability of resources, 
but it seems that not only does consensus result 
from a relatively efficient or stable economy, but 
the social political consensus guarantees the 
stability of the economy even during periods of 
slow growth. Clearly , the impact of the crisis will 
be telling in this regard, but so far nothing has 
happened to contradict this. 
antithesis between the rationale of capital, the 
objective of which is to increase its value, and the 
rationale of labour, the objective of. which is to 
improve conditions for the reproduction of the 
labour force. Consequently, the conflict has to do 
with the operation of capitalism. 
In many Latin American countries, some 
parties have tried or are trying to present them-
selves as the party of one of the sides in the 
capitalist conflict, and particularly, as a party 
which, within the State, stands up for the 
rationale of labour against the rationale of capi-
6
 Many of the ideas discussed here were first stated by 
Alvater in connection with social democracy in Europe. 
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tal. In a way, the developmentalist option which 
prevailed from the 1950s onwards represented 
an effort to seek a compromise between the two 
rationales by forming an institutional State net-
work; this might be called the "compromise 
State", to use a term coined by F. Weffort. In 
addition, certain current political experiences, 
such as those of Mexico, Venezuela and Costa 
Rica, still have something of this characteristic 
which distinguishes them from other modalities. 
What is significant is the fact that when the 
conflict or the compromise between the two 
rationales occurs within the State, the action does 
not take place at the level of classes, i.e., with 
reference to the mode of production; rather, it 
takes place within the sphere of social formation, 
which involves dominance that is politically and 
ideologically mediated. The main objective is to 
ensure that the worker becomes a citizen with the 
same rights as the bourgeois citizen. But at the 
same time a separation between the economic 
and the political levels is introduced. 
The populist and reformist discourses were 
often incomplete, but they were discourses on 
the citizen endowed with rights which are met by 
the State. When the worker claims the same 
rights as those of the bourgeois citizen, the 
economic sphere is being separated from the 
political sphere; while it is true that the worker is 
also a citizen, he is never the same as a member of 
the bourgeoisie. 
Nonetheless, when there is an intervening 
State —and that was the case during the de-
velopmentalist experiment and will probably be 
the case under a future option— the links be-
tween the economic and the political spheres are 
re-established, although preferably in the area of 
circulation and realization rather than in the area 
of production. The means for articulating the 
economic and the political spheres at the level of 
circulation are the law and money. 
The conflict between capital and labour re-
mains and it is reflected in problems with wages, 
working conditions and forms of management; 
efforts are made to solve these problems through 
State mediation. Nonetheless, State intervention 
introduces two serious questions: 
a) Work stops (partly) being a merchandise; 
it is not governed solely by market conditions and 
this changes one of the principles of capitalism, 
i.e., the free labour market. (It is not a coinci-
dence that this is one of the first things that 
neoliberal policies try to recover.) 
b) Wages become the citizen's wages and thus 
capitalism becomes less flexible. It becomes more 
difficult to lower wages. 
In difficult situations, capitalists will reject 
political intervention in the operation of the econ-
omy and will try to establish pure capitalist rela-
tions, resorting to force in order to destroy the 
sphere of policies. This explains why it is so risky 
to try to solve the contradiction of interests only 
in the political sphere, without touching the 
sphere of production. 
The question now comes to mind whether we 
are faced with a problem which cannot be solved 
in the context of capitalism, since, essentially, 
what is involved is simply the contradiction be-
tween capitalism and democracy. Capitalism it-
self, in some cases, has managed to dynamize this 
contradiction in terms of the expansion of mod-
ernization and of rationalization. But in most 
Latín American countries, and particularly dur-
ing this time of crisis, that is very difficult unless 
the objective is also to transform the capitalist 
society as it exists today. 
As has been noted, under the new develop-
ment option, the State should be the subject of 
transformation and it should be imbued with a 
willingness to change, which means that the polit-
ical project for transformation must be drawn 
up. 
The challenge is to articulate two di-
mensions, political emancipation and economic 
emancipation. This means there must be some 
socialization of economic action by way of co-
management, a more or less similar process must 
take place in the sphere of politics. 
In this dimension, groups act upon their own 
situation, transforming themselves. The alterna-
tive project represents not only an attempt to 
transform the mode of managing society, but an 
attempt to transform society itself. 
It is not sufficient, therefore, to analyse the 
characteristics of the social groups we have men-
tioned, which can support a new option in their 
present form. Although this is very important, 
what is fundamental is their capacity to change 
themselves, and objective conditions now exist 
which make this possible. 
In addition, despite the importance of the 
State the alternative project as an option of soci-
DEPENDENT SOCIETIES AND CRISIS IN LATIN AMERICA / Germán W. Rama and Enzo Faletto 147 
ety must not be seen as merely a State project. We 
have stressed that the challenge to Latin America 
is that of achieving the true integration of State 
and society. In any attempt to provide a new 
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